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1. Introduction 
In 1996 Johannesson et al. published a paper in this journal entitled “The Value of Private Safety 
versus the Value of Public Safety.” Their study used hypothetical contingent valuation survey 
questions about voting for improvements in public transportation safety and purchases of private 
safety measures to examine the degree of pure altruism and paternalistic altruism in voters’ 
decisions in a coercive tax setting. The results of their study offer indirect evidence that 
consumers are “pure altruists” (nonpaternalistic) who take into account the distribution of the 
costs and net benefits of such a measure to others when choosing whether to vote for an 
investment in safety that would impose equal costs on all tax payers1.  Their data did not, 
however, support the existence of paternalistic voters who systematically bias their voting in 
favor of public safety programs compared to their own selfish interests. Johannesson et al. also 
concluded that further empirical research was warranted.  
This paper presents a set of laboratory economics experiments designed to test the 
conjecture by Johannesson et al. under controlled conditions in which participants face an actual 
risk of financial loss rather than a hypothetical risk of loss of life. Note that distinguishing 
amongst different types of altruism is important because (with some exceptions) economic-
theoretic arguments suggest that benefit-cost analyses generally should not incorporate pure 
altruism in benefit measures (Bergstrom 1982, 2006; Johansson 1992; Milgrom 1993; Flores 
                                                 
1 In introducing their study Johannesson et al. describe their “rough way of handling” the notion that pure altruists 
with higher (or lower) values for a good might vote no (yes) to a coercive tax referendum that would provide net 
private benefits (costs) by asking a follow-up to the valuation question “where we inquire whether respondents 
believe that they are willing to pay more or less than the average car owner.” (p. 266).  They do not incorporate this 
response into the econometric modeling of the dichotomous choice valuation question.  Instead, they use the average 
response to this question in a discussion of why contingent values for a public safety program fell below values for a 
private safety program of equal magnitude.  To wit, “Of our respondents, 33% (24%) believed that their own WTP 
exceeds (falls short of) the average WTP for the public safety measure, while 43% believed that their WTP is about 
the same as the average WTP.  Thus there is a tendency to overestimate one’s own WTP relative to the WTP of 
others.  This tendency should, ceteris paribus, cause the average WTP for the public safety program to fall short of 
the average WTP for the private safety device if respondents are true altruists” (p. 273).   
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2002) 2. Pure altruism occurs when the individual is concerned about the utility of other 
individuals, irrespective of how the utility is attained.  In contrast, from a welfare-theoretic 
perspective, it has been argued that benefit cost analysis should generally only include 
paternalistic altruism (Jones-Lee 1991, 1992; Quiggin 1998). Paternalistic altruism occurs when 
an individual cares only about the level of consumption of a particular commodity by another 
person, not about the other person’s utility or overall well-being.   
Most field research that has been done on voter behavior with respect to risk and altruism 
has examined situations in which altruism is expected to increase the proportion of affirmative 
votes for public welfare measures over what would be anticipated for self-interested 
participants— i.e. in  situations where one would expect paternalistic altruism. This emphasis 
reflects a prevalent view that is frequently articulated in the value of statistical life literature that 
accounting for concern about the well-being of others increases aggregate benefits in public 
benefit-cost analyses (e.g., Jones-Lee 1991, 1992). Empirical testing of this hypothesis with 
respect to risk improvement has been inconclusive, however; some studies of ballot initiatives 
have found voting patterns that are consistent with self-interest under a narrow definition (e.g., 
Deacon and Shapiro 1975) while other research has provided evidence of “public regardingness” 
in voting behavior (e.g., Holmes 1990; Shabman and Stephenson 1994). To some extent, such 
                                                 
2 Bergstrom (1982) provided a neoclassical economic rationale for not accounting for altruism in Kaldor-Hicks 
welfare tests, leading Johansson (1994) to argue that an appropriate aggregation of valuations for a public good 
requires that individual, and therefore also aggregate, WTP be conditional on everybody else paying so as to remain 
at their initial levels of utility.  In other words, private WTP values for reducing an individual’s own risk are the 
appropriate values to be aggregated for benefit cost analyses.  However, public projects are rarely, if ever, financed 
under such conditions. Most typically, funding for specific public projects imposes coercive costs that result in 
utility gains and losses. Moreover, projects that are evaluated tend to be discrete and the initial allocation of public 
goods is inefficient. Under these conditions, Flores (2002) argued that the extrapolation of Bergstrom’s results for 
marginal changes at the optimum do not carry over to the “more modest problem [of benefit-cost analysis], 
determining whether a specific project can lead to a Pareto improvement.”  Flores further argued that under these 
more realistic conditions pure altruism should be accounted for in applied welfare analyses. Bergstrom (2006) 
acknowledges the qualifications raised by Flores, but concludes that “for a broad class of economies, a comparison 
of the private values to the costs of a projects [remains] the appropriate test for determining whether [a public 
project] leads to a Pareto improvement” (p. 349). 
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disparate empirical results might be anticipated because of the inherent incompatibilities of using 
aggregate voting data as a measure of underlying, but not directly observable, preferences. Thus, 
by necessity, aggregate modeling approaches rely on indirect proxies for costs (e.g., income for 
Deacon and Shapiro (1975)), expected risk reduction (e.g., location for Shabman and Stephenson 
(1994)), and/or altruistic concerns (e.g., political affiliation for Holmes (1990)).  Hypothetical 
contingent valuation research has also been conducted in settings, or using methods, in which 
willingness to pay for the safety of others is expected to be non-negative (e.g., Viscusi et al. 
1988; Araña and León, 2002). 
Yet, as conjectured by Johannesson et al. (1996), the coercive nature of voting and 
taxation also raises another possibility—that some people who are pure altruists will vote “no” 
on a project that would provide them with private net benefits for risk reduction, narrowly 
defined, because they are not willing to impose costs on others who will suffer a net loss from 
the cost versus benefits: 
Let us assume that [an individual] is willing to pay $t for a ceteris paribus 
increase in his own safety. His total WTP for a uniform public risk reduction of 
the same magnitude will fall short of $t if he believes that others are willing to 
pay less than $t but will still be forced to pay that amount ($t) for the project. This 
is because other individuals for whom he cares will experience a lower utility if 
the program is implemented. In turn, this decrease in the utility of others reduces 
the pure altruist’s WTP for the public safety project. (p. 264) 
 
In other words, purely altruistic behavior may in some instances lower the proportion of 
affirmative votes relative to a self-interested model.  This point was more recently 
reemphasized by Bergstrom (2006), who notes: “If we are to count the sympathetic gains 
each obtains from the other’s enjoyment, then we should not forget also to count the 
sympathetic losses each bears from the share of its cost paid by the other.” (p. 339) 
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 This paper examines the “Johannesson et al. conjecture” that an individual voter will tend 
to reject projects that impose excessive costs on others while elevating their individual 
willingness to pay when their decisions are likely to provide positive net benefits to others.  We 
also develop methods to identify and test whether deviations from private, self-interested 
willingness to pay are driven by paternalistic altruism. 
 We employ the random-price voting mechanism (RPVM) introduced in Messer et al. 
(2008), which extends the Becker-DeGroot-Marshack (BDM) mechanism (1964) for private 
goods to a public-good setting. In that study, subjects were asked to indicate the highest uniform 
tax they would approve to pay for insurance against a certain loss. The amount of the tax was 
subsequently determined by a random drawing. If a majority of participants had indicated that 
they would vote “yes” at the selected tax level or higher, the insurance policy was purchased, the 
risk of loss was removed, and the tax was collected from all members of the group. If a majority 
of affirmative votes was not attained, the policy was not implemented and no tax was collected. 
Because of the voting context, this mechanism is theoretically incentive compatible. Using 
induced-value experiments, Messer et al. (2008) further demonstrate that the mechanism is 
demand-revealing in public settings and that the continuous willingness-to-pay (WTP) values 
correspond to those obtained from referendums involving an analogous dichotomous choice. 
In the experiments described here, subjects provided the highest uniform price or tax that 
they would pay for an insurance policy that would protect them against a probabilistic loss in a 
private-good (n=1) and in a public-good setting (n=3, n=15). In addition, expected losses were 
varied across players in a way that allowed us to test for the existence of pure and/or paternalistic 
altruism. For completeness, we utilized three experimental designs. The first varied the 
probability of a loss so it most closely followed the survey framework of Johannesson et al. 
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(1996) while the second varied the loss amount and also explored the possible influence of group 
size on the public good. Providing a baseline, the third design had the losses occur with certainty 
analogous to Messer et al. (2008).  We note that recent experimental studies have provided 
considerable support for pure altruism (Charness and Rabin 2002; Engelmann and Strobel 2004; 
Messer et al. 2008). However, because these studies used induced values under certainty, they 
could not test for paternalistic altruism, which requires using a commodity. In this study, either 
privately purchased or publicly provided insurance against risk of loss was the commodity of 
interest.  Further, we couch our analysis in terms of voting decisions for risk reducing public 
programs. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the conceptual foundations and 
demonstrates how voting behavior can be used to test for the presence of paternalistic versus 
nonpaternalistic altruism; Section 3 presents the experimental design; Section 4 provides results 
and statistical tests; and Section 5 provides a summary and discussion of the results.  
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
Messer et al. (2008) built upon the “social welfare” preference model of Charness and Rabin 
(2002) to derive symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria expectations that are appropriate for the 
RPVM framework. The conceptual foundations of this study are similar but here we use induced 
values with public or private insurance against loss in a manner consistent with the framework 
introduced in Johannesson et al. (1996).  
Preferences: Since these experiments were conducted in the laboratory with small stakes, 
and since there is no generally accepted theoretical model of risk aversion for small stakes, we 
initially assumed that subjects were not risk averse. As Rabin (2000) points out, the expected 
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utility model cannot explain the presence of risk aversion in the small since observable levels of 
risk aversion in the small and large are theoretically inconsistent. Note that the purpose of this 
study was to examine the nature of altruistic preferences for risk, not to explore risk aversion in 
the small. Thus, to begin, individual selfish utility was specified as expected payoff or income 
minus private expected loss: 
1) Ui = yi − ρi,sLi,s             i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n, 
where yi denotes the income of participant i and ρi,s denotes the probability of dollar loss, Li,s, in 
treatment s for participant i in a group of n individuals. An approximate method for dealing with 
risk aversion is introduced later.  In what follows we will use the term “probability-variation” to 
refer to treatments that vary ρ, and the term “loss-variation” to indicate treatments that vary L.  
From equation 1, if a participant cares about the private utility of other participants, then 
purely altruistic utility, consistent both with Johannesson et al. (1996) and with the efficiency 
motive of Charness and Rabin (2002), can be specified as  
2) ∑
≠
+=
ij
jii UUA α , 
where α denotes the relative weight placed on the sum of others’ utilities, each denoted j. This is 
the particular form of pure altruism defined by Johannesson et al. (1996).  
Alternatively, in the case of paternalistic preferences for others’ exposure to risk, 
paternalistic utility can be written as 
3) Pi = Ui − β ρ j ,sL j ,s
j≠i
∑ , 
where participant i loses utility at rate β in the sum of others’ expected losses. Thus, paternalistic 
preferences imply that individuals care not about others’ utilities but only about the risks they 
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face. For example, paternalistic altruists might condemn smoking as bad behavior and show 
interest in helping others quit but may not be interested in other aspects of smokers’ well-being.  
Equations 1-3 present three models of behavior that can be analyzed in the public-good 
voting experiments on risk. First, individuals may be solely self-interested and not consider the 
impact of their vote on others, which is consistent with equation 1. Second, individuals may also 
show purely altruistic preferences as shown in equation 2 by considering the utilities of others. 
Or, as shown in equation 3, individuals may have paternalistic preferences and be interested in 
the risks that others face but not in their overall well-being or utility. 
Selfish Preferences: Participants in the experiments were given the opportunity to decide 
whether to purchase private and public insurance for price c to eliminate a known risk of losing 
money. The risk-neutral individual will purchase private insurance if the individual utility of 
accepting the risk is less than or equal to the individual utility of paying c to eliminate the risk:   
4) y i − ρi,sLi,s ≤ y i − c . 
The maximum price that participant i will pay to eliminate risk when equality holds in (4) is 
equal to expected value: 
5) ci,s
max = ρi,sLi,s . 
However, if an individual is truly selfish and does not care about the utilities or risks facing 
others, that individual will vote for public insurance to eliminate risk to his or her voting group if 
the tax cost to each, t, is such that 
6) y i − ρi,sLi,s ≤ y i − t . 
In this case, the maximum tax that individual i would pay to eliminate risk for the group is the 
same as the private value and remains equal to expected value: 
7) ti,s
max = ρi,sLi,s,  so ti,smax − ci,smax = 0 . 
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Purely Altruistic Preferences: In the case of pure altruism, individual i will consider the 
utilities of other individuals, j ≠ i, in voting on whether to fund a public risk reduction, which 
eliminates risk to all but imposes a tax cost t on each voter. Thus, individual i will vote 
affirmatively if  
8) y i − ρi,sLi,s + α y j − ρ j,sL j ,s( )
j≠ i
∑ ≤ y i − t + α y j − t( )
j≠ i
∑  
and the maximum tax that i will pay is 
9) sisisisi ZLt ,,,
max
, 1++= α
αρ , where 
10) sisi
sj
ij
sj
si Ln
L
Z ,,
,,
, )1(
ρ
ρ
−−=
∑
≠
 
  
and there are n > 1 voters in a voting group. Note that the difference between the maximum 
uniform tax for reducing risks to all and the own private value that i will pay to reduce risk to 
herself is determined by Zi,s , which compares own risk to the average of others’ risks: 
11) ti,s
max − ρi,sLi,s
> 0 for Zi,s > 0
= 0 for Zi,s = 0
< 0 for Zi,s < 0
⎧ 
⎨ ⎪ 
⎩ ⎪ 
. 
Thus, from (10) and (11), if her risk is greater than the average of others’ risks (as measured by 
expected value), she will pay less than her private value. If her risk is less than the average of 
others’ risks, she will pay more than her private value. 
Paternalistic Preferences: An individual with paternalistic preferences will vote in favor 
of a public risk elimination program if 
12) y i − ρi,sLi,s − βXi,s ≤ y i − t , 
where 
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13)  Xi,s = ρ j ,sL j,s
j≠ i
∑  
and will be willing to vote for a maximum tax of 
14) ti,s
max = ρi,sLi,s + βXi,s. 
This implies that a paternalist with respect to public risk will always pay more for a successful 
public risk prevention program than for an identical individual private risk reduction since 
15) ti,s
max − ρi,sLi,s
= 0 for Xi,s = 0
> 0 for Xi,s > 0
⎧⎨⎩
.  
Treatments and hypotheses drawn from the theory described here are presented in Table 1.  The 
numbers in parentheses are the expected values associated with our specific experimental design.  
 In addition, since Xi,s represents the aggregate expected gains from the insurance policy 
for all other n-1 individuals, 0
max
, >∂
∂
n
t si if the expected losses of other individuals in the group are 
positive and individuals are paternalistic.  Thus, ceteris paribus, if paternalistic altruism is 
present, we would expect higher WTP values for individuals in larger groups.  This contrasts 
with the expectation associated with pure altruism as presented in equation (10), that if additional 
members are added to the group in a way that does not affect the average expected losses of j≠i, 
then 0
max
, =∂
∂
n
t si for the pure altruist. 
Risk Aversion: As mentioned earlier, given the lack of accepted models of risk aversion 
in the small, we note that a number of studies have documented systematic deviations from the 
prediction of expected utility, which implies that risks should be valued at expected values in the 
laboratory (See, for example, Holt and Laury (2002), Harrison et al. (2005), and Holt and Laury 
(2005)). However, the potential for risk aversion in the small must be taken into account to avoid 
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a potential confound. To attempt to capture these deviations, we defined a risk premium ri,s that 
biases private values such that  
16)  ci,s
max = ρi,sLi,s + ri ,s . 
Alternatively, ri,s can be interpreted as a systematic error with a positive mean. In either case, we 
supposed that this risk aversion or positive systematic error could be a function of the 
experimental parameters of income, probability of loss, and loss, so that 
17)  ri ,s = r(yi ,ρi,s ,Li ,s ) ≥ 0 . 
If (16) is used to replace ρi,sLi,s everywhere in the foregoing analysis except in the definition of 
X and in the special case in which we assumed that, on average across subjects, 
rj ,s
j≠ i
∑ / (n − 1) = ri ,s , so that the average of others’ risk premium is the same as own risk premium 
over relevant treatments, the predictions of Table 1 do not change. That is, the predicted 
difference between public and private values (that include risk aversion or systematic error under 
this special assumption) remain unaltered. However, this requires the assumption that ri,s does not 
vary systematically with ρ or L so that the average of others’ risk premiums is always equal to 
own risk premium. Note that we assumed that both pure and paternalistic altruist respond not to 
expected value but to the value of the risk to other individuals. Since the RPVM used in this 
study obtains private (n = 1) and public values (n = 3, n=15), the difference between these 
measures is the value of interest. We can estimate a mixed model with fixed effects to predict 
this difference as a function of Zi,s and Xi,s as competing hypotheses. However, we must use 
predicted values for ci,s
max in calculating Zi,s, which can be obtained using predicted values of ci,s
max  
obtained from an estimated second-order Taylor-series expansion of (16) after ri,s from (17) has 
been substituted, as described in section 4 below.  
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3. Experimental Design 
The experiments involved 222 subjects (33 in a baseline treatment with certainty, 87 for the 
probability-variation risk treatment, and 102 for the loss-amount-variation risk treatment) who 
volunteered for the experiments in response to recruitment from a variety of undergraduate 
economics courses. Subjects received written instructions (see Reviewer Appendix) and were 
permitted to ask questions at the beginning of each part of the experiments. The instructions used 
language parallel to that commonly found in surveys for referendum voting settings (for 
example, Carson and Groves (2007)). The instructions directed each subject to vote on whether 
to fund an insurance program by submitting a bid that represented the “highest amount that you 
would pay and still vote for the insurance program.” We subsequently refer to this as the 
maximum WTP value. 
In the experiments, each subject was seated at an individual computer with a privacy 
shield and assigned to groups of varying size of either one and three (and also fifteen for the loss-
amount-variation treatment). The administrators announced the composition of each group. No 
communication was allowed. Subjects chose bids that could be anything from zero to the entire 
initial balance. Using Excel spreadsheets programmed with Visual Basic for Applications, 
subjects submitted their WTP for insurance to the experiment administrator.  
The RPVM operates in much the same way as the traditional private-good BDM 
mechanism but with several key differences (see Messer et al. (2008) for a complete discussion). 
In the RPVM, a majority of the bids determines whether the program is funded. Consequently, a 
treatment in which group size equals one is identical to the private-good BDM mechanism since 
each subject’s bid constitutes a majority.  
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In this study, the cost of the program was determined by using a random number table 
with values from 0 to 2500 that represented the cost in pennies. For example, the number 1529 
selected a cost of $15.29. Consequently, the cost was uniformly distributed between $0 and $25 
with discrete intervals of $0.01.  
Following procedures developed by Doyle (1997) to help participants understand risk, the 
probabilistic loss in our study was determined by having volunteer subjects draw ten chips, with 
replacement, from a bag of 100 chips containing a known number of red and white chips with the 
proportion reflecting ρ. Each red chip drawn meant that the subject lost a predetermined amount 
of money (L).  The values of ρ and L depended on the experiment design as hereafter described. 
After the random cost and loss were determined, subjects retrieved this information and their 
spreadsheets calculated the profits. 
All sessions consisted of two parts. The first consisted of ten low-incentive private 
RPVM rounds in which the subjects received feedback as the cost and losses were determined at 
the end of each round, giving subjects an opportunity to become familiar with the computer 
interface and to experience the incentive-compatible characteristics. The second part consisted of 
high-incentive private and public RPVM treatments in which the one treatment that resulted in 
cash payments was determined by a random draw at the end of the experiment. Thus, subjects 
did not receive any feedback during the RPVM treatments, ensuring independence of bids. 
Subjects were given complete information about the payoffs and risks faced by other subjects. 
The exchange rate for the second part of the experiment was 40 times greater than the rate for the 
first part and subjects received an average payoff of $22 for the 1.5-hour experiment. 
We tested our hypotheses by setting an identical level of risk for all of the members of a 
group (homogeneous treatments)—an expected value of loss of $2 for one group of voters, $5 for 
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another group, and $8 for a third (see Table 2). In the case of variation in risk (heterogeneous 
treatments), the voters were assigned one of three different expected value of loss ($2, $5, or $8) 
so that there was a low-, medium-, and high-risk group of voters. In the groups of three, one 
subject had each of the expected loss value of $2, $5, and $8, while in the groups of 15, five 
subjects had each of the expected loss values.   
To further explore voting behavior, we used three treatment designs. The probability-
variation treatments varied the probability of loss (0.2, 0.5, 0.8) and had a fixed loss value of 
$10, corresponding to programs that affect the probability of a particular outcome. These 
treatments were most similar to the survey design employed by Johannesson et al. (1996), which 
focused on valuing reductions in the risk of dying in a traffic accident.  The loss-variation 
treatments varied the value of the losses ($5, $12.50, $20) with a fixed probability of 0.4.  This 
corresponds to changing the magnitude of the potential loss.  In addition, we included loss-
variation treatments that involved groups of fifteen members to test the potential effect of group 
size on bidding behavior. Finally, in “baseline/calibration” treatments, losses of $2, $5, and $8 
occurred with certainty. 
 
4. Results 
As previously discussed, a risk-neutral individual’s optimal strategy in the private-good 
treatments is to submit a bid equal to the expected value of her induced loss.3 In the 
baseline/calibration experiments, in which losses occurred with certainty, subjects’ average bids 
were statistically indistinguishable from the induced loss ($1.92, $4.85, and $7.83; one-sample t-
test) (Table 3). Such results are consistent with previous research that found that the BDM 
                                                 
3 Due to the discrete costs, another optimal strategy for a risk-neutral person is to submit a bid that is one penny less 
than the expected value of the induced value. 
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mechanism in private, induced-value WTP experiments is demand revealing (Irwin et al. 1998). 
However, in designs in which loss was probabilistic and the potential existed for a greater than 
expected loss, a subject exhibiting some form of risk aversion might submit a bid that is higher 
than the expected loss. As shown in Table 3, subjects consistently submitted bids that were 
higher than expected losses in both the “private” (n=1) probability-variation ($2.31, $5.57, and 
$8.78) and the loss-variation ($2.12, $5.45, and $8.53) designs using one-sample t-tests. Mean 
bids were statistically different from expected losses for treatments involving the larger expected 
losses ($5 and $8), suggesting that subjects’ behavior exhibits risk aversion in the small. The fact 
that the relatively small magnitude of the potential loss rules out the possibility of measurable 
risk aversion from expected utility (Rabin and Thaler 2001; Rabin 2000), is consistent with these 
results supporting risk aversion in the small or some other systematic error associated with 
introducing probabilities. Another possible explanation for the overbidding is bidding error, 
which would likely raise the bids because the range for them ($0 to $25) was asymmetric around 
the expected losses. However, we note that the certainty baseline does not exhibit overbidding, in 
fact, the average bids were slightly lower, but not significantly so, than induced value (Table 3).  
We thus conclude that the elevated average bid relative to the expected value is associated with 
introducing risk aversion in the small or with the act of introducing risk into our experimental 
setting.4 
As in the private treatments, subjects in homogeneous treatments involving a public good 
submitted bids that were higher than then the expected loss (see Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3). 
Consistent with prior research on the RPVM (Messer et al. 2008), subjects’ bids in these 
                                                 
4 We note that “trimming” the data by dropping all observations from individuals whose results were two standard 
deviations away from the mean in the private case resulted in values that were consistent with the predicted values. 
Thus, the data are also consistent with systematic error.  Moreover, the average bids in the homogeneous treatments 
also were statistically indistinguishable from expected losses once the data were trimmed. 
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treatments were not statistically different than the subjects’ bids in the private treatment, which is 
consistent with the theoretical predictions from Table 1 for pure altruism but not for paternalistic 
altruism.  
Table 3 shows the effect of shifting from private goods to public goods in both 
homogeneous and heterogeneous voting settings in its comparisons of the mean bid for each 
expected loss. In general, as shown in Figures 1 and 2 and Columns 5 and 6 in Table 2, WTP in 
the heterogeneous voting situation appears to shift upward for subjects with the smallest 
expected losses ($2). Such a shift would lend support for the existence of pure altruism—some of 
those who have the least to gain from the insurance policy are willing to incur a net financial loss 
for the benefit of others in a coercive public voting situation relative to a like private or 
homogenous public setting.  By itself, such a results would also be consistent with paternalistic 
altruism. Yet, for subjects with the largest expected loss ($8), who consequently stand to gain the 
most from the insurance policy, the WTP distribution shifts downward relative to other 
treatments in the heterogeneous voting situation. Again this result is consistent with the 
Johannesson et al. conjecture of pure altruism in a coercive tax setting.  But this lowering of 
willingness to pay values is not consistent with paternalistic altruism.  For the middle group ($5 
loss) in the heterogeneous voting situation, there is no consistent directional shift between 
treatments. This too supports the case for pure altruism (see Table 1) but not paternalistic 
altruism. Note that, for treatments in which the loss amount varied, there was no systematic 
difference in WTP between the small groups of three members and the large groups of 15 
members (Figure 2 and Table 3, Columns 4 and 6).  As such, over the range of group sizes 
considered, we do not find evidence of paternalistic altruism. 
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 To compare alternative hypotheses regarding the pure altruism measure, Z, and the 
paternalistic altruism measure, X, as well as to control for the potential impact of risk aversion or 
systematic error, we used a two-stage random-effect mixed model. As previously described, bids 
in the first stage in the private treatments were estimated using a Taylor-series expansion of 
equation 16 such that  
18)  ci,s
max = β0 + β1yi + β2ρi,s + β3Li,s + β4ρi,sLi,s + β5ρi ,s2 + β6Li,s2 + εi,s + µi . 
The results show that the constant and the expected loss, ρ*L, are the only statistically significant 
variables, suggesting that the observed overbidding may not be due to systematic behavior 
except as an upward shift in bids (Table 4). Furthermore, tests of the coefficient for ρ*L failed to 
reject it as different than 1 (χ2 = 0.12, p = 0.7329). If the insignificant terms are dropped from 
(18) so that private bids are predicted by a constant and the expected value, ρ*L, the log 
likelihood ratio for the model -1345.64 and the constant (equal to 0.069) becomes insignificant 
but positive (z=0.43, p=0.665) and the coefficient on the expected value (equal to 1.059) is 
significant at the 1% level (z=46.31, p=0.000).5  
Using max,sic  predicted from (18), we conducted a second set of random-effect mixed-
model regressions, as shown in Table 5, to test the hypotheses outlined in Table 1. To test the 
potential importance of purely altruistic preferences versus paternalistic preferences, the analysis 
included both Z (pure altruism) and X (paternalistic altruism) to explain the difference between 
public and private bids given the different experiments and group sizes. The coefficient on Z was 
positive and significant at the 1% level for all experiment designs and group sizes, providing 
evidence of pure altruism.  In contrast, the coefficient on X should be positive for paternalistic 
                                                 
5 This reduction can be justified given a likelihood ratio test that fails to reject that the two models are different at 
the 5% level. 
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altruism but it tended to be small and always insignificant. Thus, we did not find support for 
paternalistic altruism but did find support for pure altruism. 
The estimated coefficient on Z ranged from a low of 0.092 in the loss-amount-variation 
design when only groups of three were considered to 0.172 in the probability-variation 
experiment. The overall estimated coefficient for Z was 0.136 and implies a value from α of 
0.160.  This implies that on average individuals weight their personal utility 6.25 times higher 
than the utilities of others. 
 
5. Conclusion 
There has been longstanding, and continued, interest within welfare economics about the degree 
and type of altruism that individuals exhibit in public-decision settings and how the effects of 
altruism should be handled in benefit-cost analyses. Such concerns have also been prominent in 
literatures on the value of safety and rational voting behavior. Despite this interest, there remains 
a lack of consensus over whether individuals account for the relative gains and losses of others in 
coercive voting situations involving risk. 
In a departure from previous efforts in this field, this research used experimental 
economic techniques to investigate directly whether the distribution of expected payoffs affects 
individual decision-making in a referendum. Consistent with the conjecture by Johannesson et al, 
we find that individuals with the most to gain from a risk-reducing policy tend to shade their 
WTP, as expressed in an affirmative vote for a public-good investment, downward. That is, in a 
heterogeneous public setting they express a maximum WTP that is significantly lower than for 
an equal reduction in private risk. Similarly, but in another direction, our results suggest that 
those who derive the least benefit from a public insurance policy tend to have a greater WTP in a 
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public voting setting than in a private decision-making setting. For a coercive tax setting, this 
suggests that individuals are willing to incur costs in the form of higher taxes that provide 
benefits or transfer income to others. In combination, the downward and upward effects are 
consistent with pure altruism. Finally, little support was found for paternalistic altruism with 
respect to mitigation of risk in this study. Thus, the results support the types of social preferences 
for efficiency found in recent studies by Charness and Rabin (2002) and Engelmann and Strobel 
(2004) found in a voluntary setting. Their results obtained using induced values under certainty, 
appear to extend to risky situations as well. However, these studies could not realistically 
examine the possibility of paternalistic altruism because of the use of induced values. 
 We recognize that the risks investigated here involve much greater probabilities and 
much smaller losses than the health risk and safety decisions that come before 
policymakers. Nonetheless, these results provide fodder for the continuing debate 
concerning altruism in welfare economics. Adopting a controlled experimental economic 
approach, this research lends additional credence to the Johannesson et al. conjecture 
regarding pure altruism in coercive tax programs for public risks or safety. These pure 
altruists consider the cost of a program that might be imposed on other voters when they 
decide whether to vote for or against public safety programs. Further, this study develops 
a method that can be used to distinguish between paternalistic and pure altruism in the 
controlled environment of the experimental economics laboratory. This method can 
potentially be applied to other commodities that involve or affect risk and that might 
engender paternalistic preferences, such as healthful versus unhealthful snack foods, 
alcoholic versus nonalcoholic beverages, and smoking aids such as gum containing 
nicotine versus cigarettes.  
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Figure 1. Probability-Variation Design 
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Figure 2.  Loss-Variation Design 
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Table 1: Predictions of Public-Private Values 
Homogeneous Risk Heterogeneous Risk 
Probability- Variation Loss- Variation Probability- Variation Loss- Variation 
Treatment 
\ 
Preferences Low 
($2) 
Average 
($5) 
High
($8) 
Low
($2) 
Average
($5) 
High
($8) 
Low
($2) 
Average 
($5) 
High
($8) 
Low
($2) 
Average
($5) 
High
($8) 
Selfish 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Purely 
Altruistic 
Preferences 
0 0 0 0 0 0 + 0 – + 0 – 
Paternalistic 
Preferences + + + + + + + + + + + + 
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Table 2. Experimental Designs 
 Probability  Loss  Expected Losses Expected  of Loss Amount
 (out of ten draws) Loss 
Loss-Variation 0.4 $5.00 4 $2 
 0.4 $12.50 4 $5 
 0.4 $20.00 4 $8 
 
Probability-Variation  0.2 $10 2 $2 
 0.5 $10 5 $5 
 0.8 $10 8 $8 
 
Baseline/Calibration 1.0 $2 NA  $2 
 1.0 $5 NA  $5 
 1.0 $8 NA  $8 
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Table 3. Mean Bids for Each Treatment 
   Private  Homogeneous     Heterogeneous 
   Group Size = 1 Group Size = 3 Group Size = 15     Group Size = 3    Group Size = 15 
(1) (2)a (3)b (4)b   (5) b   (6) b 
Baseline/Calibration (n = 33) 
Expected Loss: $2 $1.92 $2.08    $2.63 b 
Expected Loss: $5 $4.85 $5.06    $5.07 
Expected Loss: $8 $7.83 $7.99    $6.97 b  
 
 
Probability-Variation (n = 87) 
Expected Loss: $2 $2.31 $2.62    $3.91 b 
Expected Loss: $5 $5.57 a $5.75    $6.03 
Expected Loss: $8 $8.78 a $9.09    $8.10 b  
 
 
 
Loss-Variation (n = 102) 
Expected Loss: $2 $2.12 $2.10 $2.14   $2.90 b   $3.08 b 
Expected Loss: $5 $5.45 a $5.52 $5.43     $5.42   $5.56 
Expected Loss: $8 $8.53 a $8.50 $8.48   $8.11 b   $8.22 
 
 
 
Notes: 
Column 2: a indicates significantly different from the corresponding expected value at the 5% level. 
Columns 3-6: b indicates significantly different from the corresponding private value at the 5% level. 
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Table 4. Random Effects Model for Taylor-Series Expansion for Private Bid 
         
Variable      Coefficient     
Constant –1.1196 
 (0.9922) 
ρ 3.2818  
 (2.3584) 
L 0.1001 
 (0.1100) 
ρ*L 0.9609** 
 (0.1147) 
ρ2 –0.0023  
 (1.5148) 
 
L2 –0.0023 
 (0.0029) 
       
Sigma_u 1.4453 
 (0.0932) 
Sigma_e 1.4455 
 (0.0486) 
 
N                666 
 
Log Likelihood     –1344.24 
 
LR Chi2  =            795.08 
 
Prob > Chi2 =                   0.000 
        
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. 
 * < 0.05 significance. ** < 0.01 significance. 
4 
Table 5.  Random Effects Model Results for Public-Private Bids in Public  
 Probability- Loss- All 
  Variation Variation           Data                                   
 
 
Constant 0.2679  0.0657  0.1999*  
 (0.2988)  (0.1114)   (0.0888)  
 
Z 0.1722**     0.1160**  0.1362**   
 (0.0295)  (0.0228)   (0.0180)   
 
X 0.0078  0.0008     -0.0001 
 (0.0242)  (0.0017)   (0.0016)  
 
Sigma_u     0.9418  0.6583  0.7579  
 (0.1325)  (0.0848)   (0.0751)  
 
Sigma_e 2.0690  2.0687  2.0754  
 (0.0703)  (0.0437)  (0.0373)  
 
N 522  1224     1746  
 
Log Likelihood   -1155.4        -2667.1      -3826.7  
 
LR Chi2 32.78                      26            56.15  
 
Prob > Chi2 0.0000  0.0000         0.0000    
              
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses 
 * < 0.05 significance. ** < 0.01 significance. 
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Reviewer Appendix 
Experiment Instructions – Probability-Loss Variation 
 
Instructions (Part A) 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making.  In the course of the 
experiment, you will have opportunities to earn money.  Any money earned during this 
experiment is yours to keep.  Please read these instructions carefully and do not communicate 
with other participants during the experiment. 
You will receive a starting balance of $25.  At the front of the room are three bags full 
of one hundred (100) poker chips.  The red bag has 20 red chips and 80 white chips.  The green 
bag has 40 red chips and 60 white chips.  The blue bag has 80 red chips and 20 white chips.  In 
each round, you will be informed of which bag will be used and ten chips are going to be drawn 
randomly, and replaced, from this bag by subjects in the experiment.  For every white chip 
drawn, you will have to pay nothing.  For every red chip drawn, you will have you pay your 
personal loss amount of $1.00.  For example, if 4 of the 10 chips drawn are red, then you would 
have to pay $4 ($1.00 x 4) from your starting balance of $25.  
Rather than taking the chance of losing of your personal loss amount for each red chip 
drawn, you have the option of purchasing an insurance program that will remain in effect for 
the duration of the round of ten chip draws.  With an insurance program, you will not owe the 
personal loss amount in the event that red chips are drawn.  But, you will have to pay the 
experimenter, out of your starting balance, for the insurance program before any chips are drawn 
that round.   
The amount that you indicate as the highest amount that you would pay for the insurance 
program will become a vote in favor or against the program, and will determine whether or not 
the insurance program is funded.  Since you are the only voter, your vote will determine whether 
the insurance program is funded or not. 
You will decide the highest amount that you would pay and still vote for this insurance 
program; we will call this your bid.  You submit your bid, by typing it into spreadsheet, pressing 
the “Enter” key, and then clicking on the “Submit” button.  For each insurance program, you can 
bid any amount between $0 and your initial balance of $25.  Once the administrators receive 
everyone’s bid, the cost of the insurance program will be determined.   
Your bid will be compared to the cost of the insurance program, as described below.  The 
cost of the insurance program will be determined by reading off a random number table which 
has numbers from 0 to 2500.  The cost will be determined by dropping a pen onto the random 
number table.  (If more than one mark occurs from the drop, then the one closest to the upper-left 
corner will be used.)  In subsequent programs, the cost will be determined starting from the 
initial cost and reading from left to right.  The number will represent the cost in pennies.  For 
example, the number 790 would represent the cost of $7.90.  Note: since these numbers have 
been generated by a random number table each cost between $0 and $25 is equally likely.   
Whether or not the insurance program is funded depends on the amount of your bid and 
the cost of the program.  Note that you will be informed which bag will be used in the round and 
then you submit your bid prior to knowing the cost of the insurance program.  It is therefore 
important that you consider all of the information given to you about the different insurance 
programs and that you make judicious decisions. 
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Remember, you have the option of purchasing the insurance program at the beginning of 
each round and the insurance program will remain in effect or not be in effect for the duration of 
the round of ten chip draws.  There are two possible outcomes for each round: 
 
The insurance program is NOT FUNDED: The insurance program is not funded if your 
bid is less than the determined cost.  For each red chip drawn (on average 20%, 40% or 80% of 
the time depending upon which bag is used) of the 10, you will pay your personal loss amount 
from your starting balance. 
 
The insurance program is FUNDED: The insurance program is funded if your bid is equal 
to or greater than the determined cost.  In this case, you are protected from the loss regardless 
of the color of the chips pulled from the bag.  Your cash earnings for the round would be your 
initial balance ($25) minus the cost of the insurance program.  
 
Note how your bid is like a vote for or against funding the insurance program.  With your 
bid, you are deciding the highest amount you would pay and still vote for the program.  
Therefore, your bid is like a vote in favor of the insurance program if your bid turns out to be 
equal to or greater than the cost.  On the other hand, your bid is like a vote against the program if 
your bid turns out to be less than the cost.   
While your bid helps determine whether the insurance program is funded or not, your 
earnings for a particular program are based on four items: your initial balance, your personal loss 
amount, the number of red chips drawn, and the determined cost of the insurance program.  
Consider the case where the insurance program is not funded, 2 red chips are drawn (therefore, 8 
white chips are drawn) and the determined cost is $5.  In this case, your earnings would be $23 
[$25 – (2 x $1)].  However, if the insurance program was funded, your earnings would be same 
regardless of the number of red chips pulled from the bag.  In this case your balance would be 
$20 ($25 - $5).  Consider another case where the insurance program is not funded, 6 red chips are 
drawn (therefore, 4 white chips are drawn) and the determined cost is $5.  In this case, your 
earnings would be $19 [$25 – (6 x $1)].  However, if the insurance program was funded, your 
balance would be $20 ($25 - $5).  Note that regardless of whether the program is funded or not 
we will still conduct the drawing of the ten chips. 
 
Calculation of Your Earnings 
Recall that you initially entered your bid into the computer spreadsheet.  Once the cost of 
the insurance program and the number of red chips are determined, the administrator will advise 
you to click the “Update” button.  The computer will automatically indicate whether or not the 
program was funded, and your earnings will be calculated.  Your earnings will be listed in 
experimental dollars and the exchange ratio for this part of the experiment will be 60 
experimental dollars for 1 US dollar.  For example, if you earn 30 experimental dollars your 
payoff would be $0.50 US.  At the end of the experiment, we will audit all of the spreadsheets to 
ensure accuracy. 
 
It is important that you clearly understand these instructions. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
Please do not talk with other participants in the experiment. 
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Instructions (Part B) 
For the second part of this experiment, you will now be asked to decide how much you 
would pay for separate insurance programs.  The procedures are similar to those used in the first 
part of the experiment, except for four important differences. 
 
1)  For each of the insurance programs, you may be the only voter (as in the first part of the 
experiment).  However, you may also be part of a group of three people whose votes will 
decide whether or not to purchase the insurance program.  For programs where the group size 
is three, which bag will be used for the other voters in your group will be shown to you prior 
to determining your bid. 
 
2)  Whether the insurance program is funded or not will be determined by whether the majority 
of bids are greater than or less than the determined cost.  If the majority of bids is greater 
than or equal to the cost, everyone will have to purchase the insurance program at the 
determined cost.  If the majority of bids is lower than the randomly drawn cost, no one will 
purchase the insurance program.   
 
3) Only one of the nine insurance programs will actually be selected and result in cash earnings.  
Therefore, all bids will be made prior to determination of the cost of the program or the 
drawing of the chips.  After the bids are submitted, we will randomly determine which of the 
insurance programs will generate cash earnings by drawing from a bag containing nine chips 
lettered A through I.  Each letter corresponds to one of the nine programs.   
 
4) The exchange rate has changed.  You will now earn two US dollars for every three 
experimental dollars earned.  Thus, if you earn 15 experimental dollars, your payoff would 
be $10 US. 
 
For each insurance program, the experiment proceeds as follows:  
You will be given a starting balance of $25 and told how much money you and the other 
members of your group could lose.  Once again, the personal loss amount per each red chip 
drawn is $1. 
Whether or not you lose your personal loss amount depends on the ten chips drawn.  At 
the front of the room are three bags full of one hundred (100) poker chips.  The red bag has 20 
red chips and 80 white chips.  The green bag has 40 red chips and 60 white chips.  The blue bag 
has 80 red chips and 20 white chips.  One or more bags will be selected and ten chips are going 
to be drawn randomly, and replaced, from this bag by subjects in the experiment.  For every 
white chip drawn, you will have to pay nothing.  For every red chip drawn you will have you pay 
your personal loss amount of $1 unless your group has purchased an insurance program. 
For each program, you will be informed which bag will be used for you and for the other 
members of your group and you will be asked to decide upon your bid and enter that amount into 
the second spreadsheet on the computer.  Consider all of the information for the insurance 
program before submitting your bid.  For each insurance program, you can bid any amount 
between $0 and your initial balance of $25.   
Once everyone has submitted his/her bid for one program, the administrators will show 
you the information for the next program.  After the bids for all the insurance programs have 
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been entered, we will determine which of the programs will be selected and produce cash 
earnings. 
Next, we will determine the cost of the selected insurance program and whether it will be 
funded by your group.  The cost of the insurance program will be determined in exactly the same 
manner as before, except that a new random number table with values from 0 to 2,500 will be 
used.  This cost will now be the cost that each person in your group will have to pay if the 
insurance program is funded.  Recall that since these numbers have been generated by a random 
number table each cost between $0 and $25 is equally likely.   
Once again, there are two possible outcomes in the round: 
 
The insurance program is NOT FUNDED: The insurance program is not funded if a 
majority of bids from your group are less than the determined cost.  For each red chip drawn 
(on average 20%, 40% or 80% of the time depending upon which bag is selected) of the 10, you 
and everyone else in your group will pay their personal loss amount from the starting balance. 
 
The insurance program is FUNDED: The insurance program is funded if a majority of 
bids from your group are equal to or greater than the determined cost.  In this case, you and 
everyone else in your group are protected from the loss regardless of the color of the chips pulled 
from the bag.  For you and everyone else in your group, your cash earnings for the round would 
be your initial balance ($25) minus the cost of the insurance program.  Note that each person in 
your group will pay the same cost even if the personal loss amounts in your group differed. 
 
The programs, in which you are a group of one, are identical to the insurance programs 
you experienced in the first part of the experiment.  Therefore, the insurance program is not 
funded if your bid is less than the cost determined from the random number table, and program is 
funded if your bid is equal to or greater than the determined cost. 
Note once again how your bid is like a vote for or against funding the insurance program.  
With your bid, you are deciding the highest amount you would pay and still vote for the 
insurance program.  Therefore, your bid is like a vote in favor of the program if your bid turns 
out to be equal to or greater than the cost.  On the other hand, your bid is like a vote against the 
program if it turns out to be less than the cost.  When a majority of bids are equal to or greater 
than the determined cost, this translates into a majority vote in favor of the insurance program.  
Similarly, a majority of bids below the cost translates into a majority vote against the program at 
that cost. 
 
Calculation of Final Earnings 
To calculate your earnings from Part B, the administrator will inform you which 
“Update” button to click.  The computer will then calculate your earnings for Part B and add 
them to your earnings from Part A.  We will audit the spreadsheets to ensure accuracy. 
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Experiment Instructions – Loss-Amount Variation 
 
Instructions (Part A) 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making.  In the course of the 
experiment, you will have opportunities to earn money.  Any money earned during this 
experiment is yours to keep.  Please read these instructions carefully and do not communicate 
with other participants during the experiment. 
You will receive a starting balance of $25.  At the front of the room is a bag full of one 
hundred (100) poker chips: 40 red ones and 60 white ones.  In each round, ten chips are going to 
be drawn randomly, and replaced, from the bag by subjects in the experiment   For every white 
chip drawn, you will have to pay nothing.  For every red chip drawn you will have you pay your 
personal loss amount.  Your personal loss amount will vary during the course of the 
experiment.  The possible personal loss amounts are -$0.50, -$1.25, and -$2.00.  For example, if 
your personal loss amount is -$1.25, and 4 of the 10 chips drawn are red, then you would have to 
pay $5 ($1.25 x 4) from your starting balance of $25.  
Rather than taking the chance of losing of your personal loss amount for each red chip 
drawn, you have the option of purchasing an insurance program that will remain in effect for 
the duration of the round of ten chip draws.  With an insurance program, you will not owe the 
personal loss amount in the event that red chips are drawn.  But, you will have to pay the 
experimenter, out of your starting balance, for the insurance program before any chips are drawn 
that round.   
The amount that you indicate as the highest amount that you would pay for the insurance 
program will become a vote in favor or against the program, and will determine whether or not 
the insurance program is funded.  Since you are the only voter, your vote will determine whether 
the insurance program is funded or not. 
You will decide the highest amount that you would pay and still vote for this insurance 
program; we will call this your bid.  You submit your bid, by typing it into spreadsheet, pressing 
the “Enter” key, and then clicking on the “Submit” button.  For each insurance program, you can 
bid any amount between $0 and your initial balance of $25.  Once the administrators receive 
everyone’s bid, the cost of the insurance program will be determined.   
The cost of the insurance program will be determined by reading off a random number 
table which has numbers from 0 to 2500.  The cost will be determined by dropping a pen onto 
the random number table.  (If more than one mark occurs from the drop, then the one closest to 
the upper-left corner will be used.)  In subsequent programs, the cost will be determined starting 
from the initial cost and reading from left to right.  The number will represent the cost in pennies.  
For example, the number 790 would represent the cost of $7.90.  Note: since these numbers have 
been generated by a random number table each cost between $0 and $25 is equally likely.   
Whether or not the insurance program is funded depends on the amount of your bid and 
the cost of the program.  Note that you submit your bid prior to knowing the price of the 
insurance program.  It is therefore important that you consider all of the information given to you 
about the different insurance programs and that you make judicious decisions. 
Remember, you have the option of purchasing the insurance program at the beginning of 
each round and the insurance program will remain in effect or not be in effect for the duration of 
the round of ten chip draws.  There are two possible outcomes for each round: 
 
  10
The insurance program is NOT FUNDED: The insurance program is not funded if your 
bid is less than the determined cost.  For each red chip drawn (on average 40% of the time) of 
the 10, you will pay your personal loss amount from your starting balance. 
 
The insurance program is FUNDED: The insurance program is funded if your bid is equal 
to or greater than the determined cost.  In this case, you are protected from the loss regardless 
of the color of the chips pulled from the bag.  Your cash earnings for the round would be your 
initial balance ($25) minus the cost of the insurance program.  
 
Note how your bid is like a vote for or against funding the insurance program.  With your 
bid, you are deciding the highest amount you would pay and still vote for the program.  
Therefore, your bid is like a vote in favor of the insurance program if your bid turns out to be 
equal to or greater than the cost.  On the other hand, your bid is like a vote against the program if 
your bid turns out to be less than the cost.   
While your bid helps determine whether the insurance program is funded or not, your 
earnings for a particular program are based on four items: your initial balance, your personal loss 
amount, the number of red chips drawn, and the determined cost of the insurance program.  
Consider the case where the insurance program is not funded, your personal loss amount is -
$1.25, 2 red chips are drawn (therefore, 8 white chips are drawn) and the determined cost is $5.  
In this case, your earnings would be $22.50 [$25 – (2 x $1.25)].  However, if the insurance 
program was funded, your earnings would be same regardless of the number of red chips pulled 
from the bag.  In this case your balance would be $20 ($25 - $5).  Consider another case where 
the insurance program is not funded, your personal loss amount is $1.25, 6 red chips are drawn 
(therefore, 4 white chips are drawn) and the determined cost is $5.  In this case, your earnings 
would be $17.50 [$25 – (6 x $1.25)].  However, if the insurance program was funded, your 
balance would be $20 ($25 - $5).   
Note that regardless of whether the program is funded or not we will still conduct the 
drawing of the ten chips. 
 
Calculation of Your Earnings 
Recall that you initially entered your bid into the computer spreadsheet.  Once the cost of 
the insurance program and the number of red chips are determined, the administrator will advise 
you to click the “Update” button.  The computer will automatically indicate whether or not the 
program was funded, and your earnings will be calculated.  Your earnings will be listed in 
experimental dollars and the exchange ratio for this part of the experiment will be 60 
experimental dollars for 1 US dollar.  For example, if you earn 30 experimental dollars your 
payoff would be $0.50 US.  At the end of the experiment, we will audit all of the spreadsheets to 
ensure accuracy. 
 
It is important that you clearly understand these instructions. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
Please do not talk with other participants in the experiment. 
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Instructions (Part B) 
For the second part of this experiment, you will now be asked to decide how much you 
would pay for separate insurance programs.  The procedures are similar to those used in the first 
part of the experiment, except for four important differences. 
 
1)  For each of the insurance programs, you may be the only voter (as in the first part of the 
experiment).  However, you may also be part of a group of 3 or 15 people whose votes will 
decide whether or not to purchase the insurance program.  For programs where the group size 
is 3 or 15, the personal loss amounts of the other voters in your group will be shown to you 
prior to determining your bid. 
 
2)  Whether the insurance program is funded or not will be determined by whether the majority 
of bids are greater than or less than the determined cost.  If the majority of bids is greater 
than or equal to the cost, everyone will have to purchase the insurance program at the 
determined cost.  If the majority of bids is lower than the randomly drawn cost, no one will 
purchase the insurance program.   
 
3) Only one of the 15 insurance programs will actually be selected and result in cash earnings.  
Therefore, all bids will be made prior to determination of the cost of the program or the 
drawing of the chips.  After the bids are submitted, we will randomly determine which of the 
insurance programs will generate cash earnings by drawing from a bag containing 15 chips 
lettered A through O.  Each letter corresponds to one of the 15 programs.   
 
4) The exchange rate has changed.  You will now earn two US dollars for every three 
experimental dollars earned.  Thus, if you earn 15 experimental dollars, your payoff would 
be $10 US. 
 
For each insurance program, the experiment proceeds as follows:  
You will be given a starting balance of $25 and told how much money you and the other 
members of your group could lose.  Once again, the personal loss amounts per each red chip 
drawn are -$0.50, -$1.25, and -$2, and will vary from program to program.  
Whether or not you lose your personal loss amount depends on the ten chips drawn.  At 
the front of the room, there is a bag full of one hundred (100) poker chips: 40 red ones and 60 
white ones.  Ten chips are going to be drawn randomly, and replaced, from the bag in the 
experiment.  For every white chip drawn, you will have to pay nothing.  For every red chip 
drawn you will have you pay your personal loss amount unless your group has purchased an 
insurance program. 
For each program, you will be asked to decide upon your bid and enter that amount into 
the second spreadsheet on the computer.  Consider all of the information for the insurance 
program before submitting your bid.  For each insurance program, you can bid any amount 
between $0 and your initial balance of $25.   
Once everyone has submitted his/her bid for one program, the administrators will show 
you the information for the next program.  After the bids for all the insurance programs have 
been entered, we will determine which of the programs will be selected and produce cash 
earnings. 
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Next, we will determine the cost of the selected insurance program and whether it will be 
funded by your group.  The cost of the insurance program will be determined in exactly the same 
manner as before, except that a new random number table with values from 0 to 2,500 will be 
used.  This cost will now be the cost that each person in your group will have to pay if the 
insurance program is funded.  Recall that since these numbers have been generated by a random 
number table each cost between $0 and $25 is equally likely.   
Once again, there are two possible outcomes in the round: 
 
The insurance program is NOT FUNDED: The insurance program is not funded if a 
majority of bids from your group are less than the determined cost.  For each red chip drawn 
(on average 40% of the time) of the 10, you and everyone else in your group will pay their 
personal loss amount from the starting balance. 
 
The insurance program is FUNDED: The insurance program is funded if a majority of 
bids from your group are equal to or greater than the determined cost.  In this case, you and 
everyone else in your group are protected from the loss regardless of the color of the chips pulled 
from the bag.  For you and everyone else in your group, your cash earnings for the round would 
be your initial balance ($25) minus the cost of the insurance program.  Note that each person in 
your group will pay the same cost even if the personal loss amounts in your group differed. 
 
The programs, in which you are a group of one, are identical to the insurance programs 
you experienced in the first part of the experiment.  Therefore, the insurance program is not 
funded if your bid is less than the cost determined from the random number table, and program is 
funded if your bid is equal to or greater than the determined cost. 
Note once again how your bid is like a vote for or against funding the insurance program.  
With your bid, you are deciding the highest amount you would pay and still vote for the 
insurance program.  Therefore, your bid is like a vote in favor of the program if your bid turns 
out to be equal to or greater than the cost.  On the other hand, your bid is like a vote against the 
program if it turns out to be less than the cost.  When a majority of bids are equal to or greater 
than the determined cost, this translates into a majority vote in favor of the insurance program.  
Similarly, a majority of bids below the cost translates into a majority vote against the program at 
that cost. 
 
Calculation of Final Earnings 
To calculate your earnings from Part B, the administrator will inform you which 
“Update” button to click.  The computer will then calculate your earnings for Part B and add 
them to your earnings from Part A.  We will audit the spreadsheets to ensure accuracy. 
 
 
 
 
 

